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Abstract
Overnight money market rates are the predominant operational
target of monetary policy. As a consequence, central banks have re-
designed the implementation of monetary policy to keep the deviations
of the overnight rate from the key policy rate small and short-lived.
This paper uses fractional integration techniques to explore how the
operational framework of four major central banks affects the persis-
tence of overnight rates. Our results suggest that a well-communicated
and transparent interest rate target of the central bank is a particu-
larly important condition for a low degree of overnight rate persistence.
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1 Introduction
Overnight money market rates play a crucial role for signalling the intended
interest rate level and the stance of monetary policy. In recent years, cen-
tral banks redesigned their monetary policy instruments to ensure that the
overnight rate closely follows the central bank’s key policy rate and that its
volatility remains well contained. Mean and variance of the policy spreads,
i.e. the deviation of the overnight rate from its policy-intended level, are often
seen as indicators for the effectiveness of monetary policy implementation.
This paper argues that controllability of the overnight rate additionally
requires that the persistence of the policy spread remains sufficiently low.
If the persistence of the policy spread is too high, the lasting impact of
shocks would impede the signalling role of the overnight rate and the central
bank’s control over interest rates. Recently, Cassola and Morana (2008) and
Hassler and Nautz (2008) showed that the policy spread of the European
Central Bank exhibits long memory implying that the central bank’s control
of the overnight rate is weaker than expected.
The current paper sheds more light on the role of the monetary policy
design for the persistence of overnight rates. We explore how institutional
differences in monetary policy implementation are reflected in the persistence
of policy spreads. To that aim, we consider the policy spreads of the U.S.
Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and
the Swiss National Bank where the reserve requirement system, standing
facilities, open market operations and the implementation of the policy rate
feature notable differences.
Our paper adds to the growing literature on the role of monetary pol-
icy implementation for the behavior of interest rates. Following the seminal
paper by Hamilton (1996), most contributions adopt the (E)GARCH frame-
work to analyze cross-country differences in overnight rate volatility (Bar-
tolini and Prati (2006)) or its transmission along the yield curve (Colarossi
and Zaghini (2009), Nautz and Offermanns (2008)). Moreover, Pe´rez Quiro´s
and Rodrigue´z Mendiza´bal (2006) show that the introduction of the ECB’s
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symmetrical interest rate corridor has significant effects for overnight rate
dynamics. Thornton (2006) and Nautz and Schmidt (2009) discuss the role
of operating procedures for the Fed’s policy spread.
In all these contributions on the dynamics and volatility of overnight rates,
the policy spread is assumed to be integrated of order zero (I(0)) and the
possibility of long memory is neglected. However, ignoring long memory may
imply an underestimation of the persistence of shocks and adversely affect
estimation results, see Sun (2006). Since the focus of our attention is on the
persistence of overnight rates, we apply fractional integration techniques to
allow for the presence of long memory in the policy spreads of central banks.1
Our results indicate that there are partially offsetting effects of a central
bank’s monetary framework on the persistence of the policy spread. Never-
theless, the evidence obtained for different central banks and monetary policy
implementation regimes suggests that a well-communicated and transparent
interest target plays a particular role for keeping the persistence of the policy
spread sufficiently low.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly
recalls the features of long memory models for measuring the persistence of
time series. Section 3 discusses how the operational framework of a central
bank could be related to the persistence of the policy spread. Section 4
introduces the data and presents the empirical results. Section 5 contains
some concluding remarks.
2 Long Memory Models
2.1 Fractional Integration and Persistence
If a central bank considers the overnight rate as operational target of mon-
etary policy, its deviations from the policy rate should be short-lived and
1Fractional integration techniques have been applied in various economic contexts. Re-
cent examples include the changing persistence of inflation (Kumar and Okimoto (2007)),
unemployment rates (Caporale and Gil-Alana (2007)), and foreign exchange rates (Cheung
and Lai (2001)).
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stationary. Restricting the attention to I(0) and I(1) processes, empirical
contributions on the dynamics of overnight rates typically conclude that pol-
icy spreads are integrated of order zero (I(0)). In fact, assuming a non-
stationary I(1) policy spread would imply that the central bank lost any
control over its operational target. However, recent evidence on the ECB’s
policy spreads indicate that the central bank’s impact on the overnight rate
might be weaker than expected. In particular, Hassler and Nautz (2008)
and Cassola and Morana (2008) found that the Eonia spread is stationary
but exhibits long memory with a fractional order of integration d ≈ 0.25.
Long-memory behavior in policy spreads implies that there is a long range
dependence between the overnight rate and the policy rate which cannot be
captured by I(0) processes like e.g. standard short memory ARMA models.
Let y be fractionally integrated of order d such that it can be transformed
into an I(0) process s by fractional differencing2 of order d,
(1− L)dyt = st . (1)
If s is white noise, y is called a fractional white noise process. In order
to demonstrate the features of long-memory in a policy spread and to il-
lustrate the consequences of wrongly ignoring it, we fitted a short-memory
ARMA(p,q)-model to a simulated fractional white noise series. Figure 1 dis-
plays the autocorrelation function (ACF) of a fractional white noise process
with d = 0.4 together with the ACF of the fitted ARMA model.3 While the
theoretical ACF implied by the ARMA model drops to zero with exponential
decay, the ACF of the fractional white noise process with d = 0.4 exhibits
hyperbolic decay and declines much more slowly.
The different patterns in the ACFs have direct implications on the con-
clusions drawn from impulse response analysis. If y is misspecified as short-
memory ARMA model, 95% of an initial shock should have vanished after
2L is the lag operator. The expansion of (1 − L)d is given by 1 − dL − d(1−d)2! L2 −
d(1−d)(2−d)
3! L
3 − . . . .
3The autocorrelation function at lag k of fractional white noise can be expressed as
ρ(k) = Γ(k+d)Γ(1−d)Γ(k−d+1)Γ(d) , where Γ(·) is the gamma function.
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Fractional white noise fitted ARMA model
Notes: Sample process with T=1000 observa-
tions (1000 observations for initialization), d =
0.4, ARMA(2, 2)-specification as suggested by AIC
with maximum lag orders max(p) = max(q) = 8.
8 periods. In the true long-memory model, however, the same effect takes
more than 40 periods. Apparently, short-memory ARMA models can hardly
reflect the autocorrelation structure of long memory processes in an ade-
quate way. In particular, ignoring long memory in policy spreads can lead
to considerable misperceptions regarding the persistence of shocks and the
controllability of the overnight rate.
2.2 Estimating Fractionally Integrated Processes
Let yt be a covariance stationary process observed at t = 1, . . . , T with
spectral density f(λ). By assumption,
f(λ) ∼ Gλ−2d as λ −→ 0+ (2)
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Robinson (1995) establishes the consistency of the local Whittle estimate un-
der (2) and additional regularity and mild homogeneity conditions:5 d̂LW
p−→
d as T →∞. Under somewhat stronger assumptions, Robinson (1995) shows
that the (asymptotic) variance of the estimator is 1
4m
. Thus, the local Whit-
tle estimator may also serve as an approximate test for long memory. Since
overnight rates are often characterized by periodic outliers and strong cal-
endar effects, we have to take into account that additive outliers may imply
a strong downward bias on estimates of the long memory parameter, see
Haldrup and Nielsen (2007).
3 Monetary Policy Implementation and the
Persistence of Policy Spreads
Let us now consider the relation between the persistence of policy spreads
and some features of monetary policy implementation. To that aim, we char-
acterize the Bank of England (BoE), the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed), the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB), and the Swiss National Bank (SNB) focussing
4In our application, we choose m in line with the optimality criterion introduced by
Henry (2001).
5In particular, the bandwidth m has to tend to infinity much more slowly than T , such
that the proportion of the frequency band involved in the actual estimation tends to zero
as T →∞.
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on the following aspects of their monetary set-up: i) the reserve requirement
system, ii) the conduct of open market operations, iii) the role of standing fa-
cilities, and iv) the implementation of the central bank’s policy rate. In cases
of significant reforms of the monetary framework, we will consider the cor-
responding sub-samples to examine the impact of the institutional changes
on policy spread persistence.6 In the following, we briefly discuss the op-
erational frameworks along the above criteria and derive partially offsetting
implications on the persistence of the policy spread.
3.1 Reserve Requirements
Reserve requirements can be a powerful tool to smooth overnight rates within
the maintenance period. In fact, interest rate smoothing can nowadays be
seen as the main reason for imposing reserve requirements.7 Ceteris paribus,
a more effective reserve requirement system should contribute to a less per-
sistent policy spread. In the euro area, for example, remunerated required
reserves have been an effective liquidity buffer for the money market. As a
result, deviations of the overnight rate from the policy intended target level
should be small and short-lived. In contrast, the persistence of the policy
spread might be higher in the U.S. where banks have used “sweep accounts”
on a large scale to circumvent the opportunity costs of non-remunerated min-
imum reserve requirements, see e.g. Carpenter and Demiralp (2008).8 In the
UK, required reserves were completely absent until May 2006. Since then,
however, the BoE has encouraged banks to choose voluntary levels of required
reserves.
The BoE’s implementation of required reserves differs from the ECB’s
6The persistence of policy spreads may change while operational frameworks remain
the same. For example, because the persistence of a determinant of policy spreads like
e.g. collateral prices changed. However, these changes are extremely hard to identify and
beyond the scope of this paper.
7About two thirds of the central banks of OECD countries employ minimum reserve
requirements, see O’Brien (2007).
8Sweep accounts are automated transfer of deposits to virtual accounts which are not
subject to minimum reserve requirements. For some banks and periods, reserves could
have been even below the level needed for transaction purposes.
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practice in two notable aspects, see BoE (2007) and ECB (2006). First, the
BoE allows banks to deviate from the reserve target by +/− 1%, whereas
the ECB requires exact fulfillment of the reserve requirement. Second, in
contrast to the ECB, the BoE remunerates required reserves exactly at the
policy rate, which further emphasizes the central bank’s commitment to its
interest rate target. Both measures increase the elasticity of funds around the
BoE’s target rate. Therefore, we expect that policy spread persistence in the
UK has been particularly low under the BoE’s new operational framework.
3.2 Open Market Operations
Open market operations are the dominant tool for the liquidity management
of central banks. The dynamics of interest rates may depend on the frequency
of open market operations. In particular, while the ECB usually intervenes
in the money market only once a week, the Fed manages the liquidity of
the banking system on a daily basis. Ceteris paribus, a very active liquidity
management of the central bank should increase the central bank’s impact
on the overnight rate and, thus, decrease the persistence of policy spreads.
However, the Fed might have intervened frequently in the money market in
order to offset persistent deviations of the overnight rate from the policy rate
caused by the absence of a well-functioning minimum reserve system. As a
consequence, the combined effect of frequent open market operations and a
noneffective reserve system on the policy spread is not clear and could be
even country-specific.
The impact of open market operations on the persistence of the policy
spread may also depend on the refinancing risk perceived by the money mar-
ket. As long as banks are confident that their demand for reserves is met
at the policy intended interest rate level, deviations of the overnight rate
from the policy rate should be small and transitory. For example, until
March 2004, the refinancing risk of Euro area banks had been particularly
small because the ECB’s weekly main refinancing operations (MROs) had
a bi-weekly maturity, i.e. the refinancing opportunities overlapped. Since
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March 2004, however, with the introduction of the new operational frame-
work, the ECB has shortened the maturity of MROs from two to one week.
As a consequence, there is no overlap of subsequent MROs anymore and
auction volumes doubled, probably making banks’ refinancing more difficult
and more risky. In fact, banks’ increased refinancing risk may explain the
significant increase in the persistence of the ECB’s policy spread under the
new framework, see Hassler and Nautz (2008).
3.3 Standing Facilities
In the ECB’s regular refinancing operations both the maturity and the vol-
ume of reserves allocated to the banking sector are under the central bank’s
control. By contrast, standing facilities allow banks to deposit or lend re-
serves at short notice and on their own initiative. In order to keep reserves
under control and to promote active trading in the money market, central
banks set interest rates of their deposit and lending facilities well below and
above the policy rate, respectively. Typically, the policy rate is set exactly
at the mid of the corridor because the opportunity cost of holding posi-
tive or negative balances at the central bank should be equal at the central
bank’s interest rate target, see Whitesell (2006). Deposit and lending rates
of standing facilities define lower and upper bounds for overnight rates. For
many central banks including the ECB, the resulting interest rate corridor
has proved to be an effective way to prevent the overnight rate from extreme
fluctuations. Advancing on the ECB’s corridor, the BoE recently introduced
a new sophisticated system of standing facilities where the width of the inter-
est rate corridor shrinks systematically at the end of the reserve maintenance
period. In line with Pe´rez Quiro´s and Rodrigue´z Mendiza´bal (2006), effective
corridor systems may not only constrain overnight rate volatility, they may
also contribute to a low persistence of the policy spread.
Introducing a well functioning corridor system is not always an easy task.
In the U.S. financial sector there has been a long “tradition against borrow-
ing” from the central bank. In particular, using the Fed’s discount credit
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has often been interpreted as a sign of management failures, see e.g. Hakkio
and Sellon (2000). As a consequence, banks refrained from using the Fed’s
lending facility and the discount rate could not function as a ceiling for the
Federal Funds rate. In 2003, the Fed has introduced new lending facilities,
including the primary credit facility where liquidity is supplied at rates 100
bp above the Federal Funds rate target. So far, however, banks have used the
new facility only reluctantly, see Furfine (2003). Apparently, the tradition
against borrowing is still an issue in the U.S.
3.4 The Implementation of the Policy Rate
The persistence of the policy spread may also depend on how the policy
rate is implemented by the central bank. For example, the relation between
the ECB’s policy rate implemented as the minimum bid rate announced
in its MROs and the target level of the overnight rate is not very clear.
First, since maturities and collateral requirements differ for the corresponding
transactions, the “natural” level of the policy spread is uncertain and may
even vary over time, see Linzert and Schmidt (2010). Second, marginal and
average MRO allotment rates contain new information about the liquidity
situation in the money market in addition to the minimum bid rate, see
Abbassi and Nautz (2010). Following Tucker (2004), the BoE conducts all
short-term repos at the policy rate “to rule out speculation about whether the
result of a tender revealed anything about the MPCs rate intentions.” A third
distinguishing feature of the ECB’s policy rate is its inherent asymmetry. In
contrast to the symmetrical target used by the Fed, a minimum bid rate may
be particularly effective for signalling lower bounds for the overnight rate
whereas upper bounds are less clear. Therefore, an explicit commitment of
the central bank to a transparent interest target should contribute to a low
persistence of the policy spread.
In the U.S. the importance of the Federal funds rate target for the im-
plementation and communication of monetary policy decisions has increased
significantly over time, see Thornton (2006). While the target rate was pub-
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lished only with a delay of 45 days before 1994, it has been announced and
explained immediately after the Fed’s rate decision since then. In particular,
since 2000, the Fed further improved its communication by the publication of
statements about the outlook of monetary policy and the balance of risk, see
e.g. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007). As a consequence, we expect that the
persistence of the U.S. policy spread has significantly decreased since 1994.












































Notes: The indices old and new refer to the monetary policy implementation regimes
defined in Table 2. Policy spreads are defined as spread between the representative
overnight rate and the central bank’s policy rate.
Concerning the central bank’s interest rate target, the Swiss National
Bank (SNB) is a special case. In contrast to many other central banks, the
SNB does not target the overnight rate but a market rate with three month
maturity.9 Moreover, there is only a target range for the three month rate
rather than a fixed policy rate. Accordingly, even persistent deviations of
the operating target from the mid of the range do not necessarily imply a
change in the policy stance. For the sake of comparability, we define the SNB
9According to Jordan and Kugler (2004), the overnight rate is not an appropriate
operating target because the SNB may employ short-term money market rates to offset
short-run pressures on the foreign exchange market.
11
policy spread as the spread between the overnight rate and the mid-point of
the target range for the three month rate. For the SNB, the less prominent
role given to overnight rates and the less explicit definition of the target rate
should imply a highly persistent policy spread.
Table 1 summarizes the partially offsetting implications of the various
regimes of monetary policy implementation for the persistence of the policy
spread.
4 The Persistence of Policy Spreads
4.1 Data
Calendar effects and outlier adjustment
Our empirical analysis on the link between the persistence of policy spreads
and monetary policy implementation is based on daily data of representative
overnight rates in the U.S., the euro area, the United Kingdom and Switzer-
land. In all these countries, overnight rates exhibit strong calendar effects
including large interest peaks and troughs especially at the end of a reserve
maintenance period. According to Haldrup and Nielsen (2007), outliers can
severely mask the long memory properties of the data. Moreover, it is well
understood by markets that seasonal increases of overnight rate volatility
are temporary and unrelated to signals about the monetary policy stance.
Following Thornton (2006), we excluded all end-of-period observations from
the sample and regressed the remaining observations on end-of-month, end-
of-quarter, end-of-semester, and end-of-year dummy variables to ensure that
our results are not driven by calendar effects. Figure 2 displays the adjusted
overnight rate, the corresponding policy rate and the resulting policy spread
for each central bank under consideration.
Sample periods and monetary policy implementation regimes
For each central bank, the observation period ends in June 2007, i.e. im-
mediately before the start of the international liquidity crisis when spreads
12
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Notes: In each chart, the interbank rate and the corresponding target level are plotted on
the right axis. The policy spread (adjusted for end-of-maintenance period and calendar
effects) is plotted on the left axis. The shaded areas indicate different regimes of monetary
policy implementation. Data sources: Swiss National Bank, Euribor FBE, Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, Bank of England.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Policy Spreads
Monetary policy implementation regime Policy spread
mean std. dev. median
European EMUold 27 Jun 2000 to 8 Mar 2004 0.071 0.14 0.05
Monetary Union EMUnew 9 Mar 2004 to 30 Jun 2007 0.066 0.04 0.07
Switzerland CH 1 Jan 2000 to 30 Jun 2007 -0.266 0.24 -0.233
United Kingdom UKold 5 Jun 1997 to 17 May 2006 -0.061 0.40 -0.08
UKnew 18 May 2006 to 28 Jun 2007 0.057 0.05 0.05
United States USold 1 Mar 1984 to 31 Jan 1994 0.054 0.25 0.035
USnew 1 Feb 1994 to 18 Jan 2000 0.006 0.17 0.01
USnew 19 Jan 2000 to 30 Jun 2007 0.006 0.09 0.00
Notes: Policy spread statistics are calculated for daily data adjusted for calendar effects.
Policy spreads are defined as spread between the representative overnight rate and the central
bank’s policy rate.
between unsecured money market rates and the policy rate sharply increased.
The starting points of the various samples and sub-samples are central bank
specific to account for significant changes in the operational framework, see
Table 2. Following Hamilton (1996), the U.S. sample starts in March 1984.
Further sub-samples refer to 1994 when the role of the Federal Funds rate
target significantly increased and to 2000 when the Fed’s communication im-
proved considerably. For the euro area, the sample starts in June 2000 with
the introduction of the ECB’s minimum bid rate. A second sub-sample cap-
tures the introduction of the ECB’s new framework in March 2004. With a
view to the recent reforms of the BoE, the UK sub-samples begin in 1997 and
May 2006. No further sub-samples seem to be required for the Swiss sample
which starts in 2000 with the launch of the SNB’s target band for the three
month rate.
A comparison of descriptive statistics across the different implementation
regimes (see Table 2) suggests that within countries, the evolution of mone-
tary policy implementation leads to a reduction of the absolute value of the
mean policy spread for consecutive regimes. The decline in volatility is even
more obvious, indicating that central banks can achieve a standard devia-
14
tion of the overnight rate of less than ten basis points, in case they seem
to consider the overnight rate as an operational target, and subsequently
improve their implementation. While the standard deviation of the policy
spread is only five basis points or less for EMUnew and UKnew, higher stan-
dard deviations were recorded for the U.S. (although improving over time)
and the previous UK regime, where the central bank had only few counter-
parties for their regular operations, compared the ECB and the BoE’s new
implementation regime.
4.2 Empirical results
Table 3 summarizes our empirical results on the persistence of policy spreads
for all central banks and monetary policy implementation regimes. We found
that the ECB’s policy spread is I(0) before but fractionally integrated with
long memory after March 2004. In line with Hassler and Nautz (2008),
the estimated order of fractional integration (d̂) increases from d̂ ≈ 0 to
d̂ = 0.269. This notable change in persistence is confirmed by the p-values
corresponding to the null hypothesis “d=0”. These results strongly indicate
that the policy spread exhibits long-memory under the ECB’s new frame-
work. From a monetary policy implementation perspective, the increased
persistence could be due to banks’ increased refinancing risk induced by the
introduction of shorter-term and non-overlapping refinancing operations, see
Table 1. Yet, since d is clearly below 0.5, the overnight rate remains under
the ECB’s control.
From 1984 to 1994, all criteria except the frequency of open market op-
erations suggest a high degree of policy spread persistence for the U.S., see
Table 1. In fact, there is clear evidence in favor of long memory of the
U.S. policy spread during the first monetary policy implementation regime
(USold). In particular, short memory is rejected at any conventional signifi-
cance level. Apparently, in this period the very active liquidity management
of the Fed could not offset the policy spread persistence induced by an inef-
fective reserve requirement system and an opaque interest rate target. Since
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1994, the Fed had put much more emphasis on the Federal Funds rate target
and its communication to the public. Our results indicate that this change
in the implementation of monetary policy had been sufficient to decrease the
U.S. policy spread persistence significantly. Since 2000, the volatility of the
Federal Funds rate has decreased significantly due to a further improvement
of the Fed’s communication strategy and the reform of the discount window,
see Table 2. As expected, these additional features of the Fed’s operational
framework did not increase the persistence of the policy spread. The esti-
mated order of fractional integration remains close to zero and short-memory
of the policy spread cannot be rejected.
Table 3: Long Memory Parameters of Policy Spreads
Monetary policy implementation regime d̂LW p-value
CH 1 Jan 2000 to 30 Jun 2007 0.443 0.000*
EMUold 27 Jun 2000 to 8 Mar 2004 0.000 0.998
EMUnew 9 Mar 2004 to 30 Jun 2007 0.269 0.001*
UKold 6 Jun 1997 to 17 May 2006 0.055 0.271
UKnew 18 May 2006 to 28 Jun 2007 0.091 0.311
USold 1 Mar 1984 to 31 Jan 1994 0.246 0.000*
USnew 1 Feb 1994 to 18 Jan 2000 0.015 0.609
USnew 19 Jan 2000 to 30 Jun 2007 0.066 0.146
Notes: The Table shows the local-Whittle estimates for the long memory parameter of
policy spreads during various regimes of monetary policy implementation. The band-
width m has been determined in line with Henry (2001). The p-value refers to the
two-sided test of the null hypothesis H0 : d = 0 against H1 : d 6= 0. * marks significance
at the 1% level.
In contrast to the EMU and the U.S. there is no evidence in favor of long
memory in the UK policy spread. Under the new regime, starting in May
2006, low persistence of policy spreads is in line with most of the features
of monetary policy implementation, see Table 1. Compared with the results
obtained for the U.S. the low persistence of UK policy spreads during the
first sub-sample is more puzzling. It seems that daily interventions joint
with a rather clear statement concerning the intended interest rate level had
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ensured the BoE’s control of the overnight rate, see Wetherilt (2003). While
overnight rate volatility was at a non-acceptable high level, the persistence
of overnight rate fluctuations around the BoE’s interest rate target was only
small.
These results indicate that a strong emphasis on a well-communicated
interest rate target may greatly reduce the persistence of the policy spread.
The hypothesis of a link between policy spread persistence and the imple-
mentation of the policy rate is confirmed by the results found for Switzerland.
Since the SNB’s policy rate refers to the three month rate, the link between
the policy rate and the Swiss overnight rate is only weak and the persistence
of the implied spread should be large. In fact, the order of fractional frac-
tional of the Swiss policy spread is very close to 0.5 reflecting that overnight
rate fluctuations play only a minor role in the monetary implementation
strategy of the SNB, see Jordan and Kugler (2004).
4.3 Detecting breaks in persistence
So far, we explored the impact of monetary policy implementation on overnight
rate persistence under the assumption that potential break points in persis-
tence are known. As a consequence, we compared overnight rate persistence
of various pre-defined monetary policy regimes and did not estimate the tim-
ing of the regimes. In this section, we discuss whether a hypothesized change
in persistence does in fact coincide with a change in the implementation
framework. Our analysis will be based on a test for a change in the order
of integration from I(0) to I(1) (or vice versa) at an unknown break point,
see Kim et al. (2002). Hassler and Scheithauer (2010) show that this test
can also be applied in a long memory context. Breaks in persistence are not
an issue for Switzerland and the UK (see Table 3), while Hassler and Nautz
(2008) already investigated the changing persistence of the Eonia spread. In
the following, we therefore concentrate on the US where the evidence pre-
sented in the previous subsection suggests that overnight rate persistence has
decreased since February 1994.
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Table 4: Change in persistence at unknown break point
Test results for the U.S. policy spread
test critical values
Sample statistic 5% 10%
USold 1 Mar 1984 to 30 Jun 2007 0.096 0.234 0.315
USnew 1 Feb 1994 to 30 Jun 2007 0.578 0.234 0.315
Notes: Test of the null hypothesis H0 “Process is I(0)” against H1 “process changes
from long memory I(d) with d > 0, to I(0), at unknown break point”. Mean Chow
statistic with correction for constant. Lower tail critical values from Kim et al. (2002),
Table 1 (b), sample size T = 2000. H0 is rejected when the test statistic is below the
critical value, by construction of the test statistic.
The endogenous break point tests shown in Table 4 confirm, on the one
hand, that overnight rate persistence has decreased – at some unknown date
– during the period from 1984 until 2007. On the other hand, there is no
significant break in persistence in the more recent period starting in February
1994 when Federal funds rate targeting has been introduced.10 This result,
however, does not necessarily imply that the break in persistence occurred
exactly in February 1994.
In fact, Hassler and Scheithauer (2010) have demonstrated that estimat-
ing an unknown break point is very difficult in a long memory context. In
order to shed more light on the break point, we applied the endogenous break
point test recursively with a varying starting point t of the sample period,
[t, 30 Jun 2007]. If the true break occurs in February 1994, the test statistic
should not be significant for samples starting in 1994 or later. Only if suf-
ficiently many observations of the high-persistence regime are included, the
break in persistence will be indicated by a significant test statistic, see Kim
(2000).
Figure 2 summarizes the results of this backward testing procedure. The
endogenous break point test is always significant at the 5% significance level
10The results of endogenous break point tests are robust regarding the use of alternative
test statistics, like the maximum statistic and the mean-exponential statistic, and also
with respect to details of test implementation, such as the choice of the deterministic.
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for samples starting in August 1991 and earlier. Significance at the 10%
level at least requires that the sample starts in May 1992. However, as
discussed before, a considerable fraction of the sample needs to be integrated
of order d > 0 in order to be detected by the endogenous break point tests.
Therefore, the unknown break in persistence in the US policy spread occurred
a considerable time after May 1992 which confirms our hypothesis that the
break is related to the new monetary policy implementation regime starting
in February 1994.11
4.4 Why to care about the persistence of the policy
spread?
The empirical analysis of the previous sections showed that the way how
monetary policy is implemented by the central bank affects the degree of
persistence of the policy spread. In particular, the results indicate that a well-
communicated and transparent interest rate target helps to avoid persistent
deviations of the overnight rate from its policy-intended level. Yet, why
should monetary policy care about the behavior of the policy spread?
While there is an increasing literature on the role of inflation persistence,
the consequences of overnight rate persistence for both, monetary policy and
financial markets seem to be under-researched. According to Ho (2008, p10),
“persistent deviations from the policy target, especially if not explainable by
purely technical factors, may risk being interpreted as either an unintended
failure to achieve the announced policy stance or an intended deviation from
it.” Apparently, neither unintended nor intended target deviations are a
desirable policy outcome. If the deviations of the overnight rate are unin-
11In order to shed more light on the timing of the break, we conducted a Monte Carlo
study (n = 100) in spirit of Hassler and Scheithauer (2010), where the simulated process
breaks from d = 0.246 to d = 0 exactly in February 1994, i.e. we calibrate the simulation
to the estimation results presented in Table 3. In accordance with the recursive test results
obtained for the U.S. policy spread (see Figure 2), the Mean Chow test statistic in the
Monte Carlo study (true break point in February 1994) becomes significant at the 10%
level for samples starting between February 1991 (15% quantile) and December 1993 (85%
quantile). This interval clearly covers our result for the U.S. policy spread that the test
for a change in persistence becomes significant for t ≈ May 1992.
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Mean Chow statistic according to Kim et al. (2002) for samples [t, 2007] of the
U.S. policy spread (solid line). Horizontal axis: Sample starting point t. Dashed
lines indicate 5% and 10% critical values, see also notes to Table 4.
tended, persistent policy spreads indicate that the effectiveness of monetary
policy implementation should be improved. Intended target deviations, on
the other hand, question the credibility of central bank announcements. The
main problem of persistent policy spreads seems, however, that it is often
unclear to what extent e.g. an observed increase in the policy spread is
intended by the central bank. For example, it is still under debate what fac-
tors contributed to the puzzling widening of the ECB’s Eonia spread that has
been observed from 2005 to 2007, see Linzert and Schmidt (2010). Therefore,
persistent policy spreads confront financial markets with a signal extraction
problem which can impede the communication about the monetary policy
stance in a significant way.
As persistent policy spreads may reduce the information contained in
overnight rates about future monetary policy, they may also affect the cen-
tral bank’s control over longer term interest rates and, thus, over the shape
20
Table 5: The persistence of U.S. T-Bill spreads
Monetary policy implementation regime d̂LW s.e.
USold 1 Mar 1984 to 31 Jan 1994 0.749 0.071
USnew 1 Feb 1994 to 30 Jun 2007 0.598 0.065
Notes: The Table shows the local-Whittle estimates for the long memory parameter d
of the spread between the three-month U.S. Treasury Bill rate and the Federal Funds
rate target for the two regimes of monetary policy implementation identified in Table 1
together with the corresponding asymptotic standard errors. Bandwidth m = dT 0.5e.
Data source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
of the yield curve. In a first attempt to shed some light on this issue, we
considered the spread between the US three month Treasury bill rate and the
Federal funds rate target. In accordance with the monetary policy regimes
found in the previous section, we estimated the persistence of the spread for
the two periods 1984-1994 and 1994-2007 separately. In line with our findings
obtained for the Federal funds rate, the results presented in Table 5 indicate
that the improved communication of U.S. monetary policy may have also
contributed to a less persistent T-Bill spread and, thus to improved control-
lability of longer-term rates. This indicates that it might be an interesting
avenue for future research to explore the relationship between the effective-
ness of monetary policy implementation and the behavior of longer-term
interest rates.
5 Conclusion
This paper explored the relation between the persistence of the policy spread
and the monetary policy implementation of a central bank. We characterized
the monetary framework of the Bank of England (BoE), the U.S. Federal Re-
serve (Fed), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Swiss National Bank
(SNB) focussing on i) the role of reserve requirements, ii) the conduct of open
market operations, iii) standing facilities, and iv) the implementation of the
central bank’s policy rate. In cases of significant reforms of the monetary
21
framework, we also considered the corresponding sub-samples to examine
the impact of the institutional changes on policy spread persistence. We
found that the central bank’s influence on the overnight rate depends on the
monetary policy implementation regime. The use of fractional integration
techniques revealed that policy spreads exhibit different degrees of persis-
tence, indicating that the monetary policy design determines the strength of
the relation between the overnight rate and the central bank’s policy rate.
Our results suggest that the introduction of remunerated required re-
serves (see e.g. O’Brien (2007)) may reinforce the low persistence of the
policy spread in the U.S. and, thereby, enhance the Fed’s control of money
market interest rates. However, while the partial effect of a single monetary
instrument is obvious in most cases, the combined effect of a whole set of
instruments on policy spread persistence is less clear. Due to offsetting impli-
cations, for example, low persistence can be found in monetary regimes with
and without effective reserve requirements depending on e.g. the frequency
of open market operations and the transparency of the policy rate.
The evidence found for the different monetary policy regimes indicates
that the existence and clear communication of a target level for the overnight
rate is a particular important condition for a low persistent policy spread. In
particular, the increased role of the Federal Funds rate target and the Fed’s
enhanced communication about the future interest rate path has significantly
decreased the persistence of the policy spread in the United States. The
merits of a well-communicated interest rate target for the controllability of
the overnight rate can be seen in the behavior of the policy spread during the
recent credit markets turmoil, see Taylor and Williams (2009). Although the
volatility of the federal funds rate has sharply increased since August 2007,
controllability of the federal funds rate has not been a major issue because
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